1- **Where does content in an artwork come from?**

6 March 2011 by pcNielsen 2 Comments

Image Journal featured artist John Frame in their last newsletter. Frame's work is fascinating, and slightly disturbing, and in an interview he says a couple of things I felt the need to respond to in some form or fashion.

The subject matter of art can be anything that the artist chooses. The content however will always and only be who the artist has made him or herself into.

There is a lot of truth in this statement. I've said before, particularly when talking about painter Thomas Kinkade, that the subject matter of art is not something I'll debate with an artist. I may not appreciate every subject, I may not be drawn into every subject, but subject matter is up to the artist. Frame's point about content being separate from subject matter is not something that I've considered, at least not using those terms.

Subject: An object, scene, incident, etc., chosen by an artist for representation

Content: Something that is to be expressed through some medium, as speech, writing, or any of various arts

In general I think of the subject of a work of art as a tool for conveying what Dictionary.com suggests as the content (more commonly referred to, it seems to me, as the message or meaning). Frame's comment about content seems to born out of Modernism, which commonly glorifies the individual. Curiously though, his observation seems somewhat aloof — if I can make this kind of judgment based such a brief video interview. For some reason, the comment comes across as academic more than personal.

This is an age-old debate really, one that is not a stranger to The Aesthetic Elevator. How much of the artist should come through in a work? Is serious artwork self-expressive or reserved? Is the content of a painting negated by the raucous lifestyle of of the painter?

We expect each artist to have his or her own style. We each work a little bit differently. We each respond to inspiration around us in our own way. Each artist has their own process. We each come from different roots that color our approaches, our choices on subject matter and so forth. Each artist has a different passion that will show up over time in their style. But is this, "who the artist has made him or herself into," really what amounts to content, the meaning of a work? Frame talks about meaning a little later in the interview.

"When people ask what the work is about, the real answer is that it isn't about anything and that's not to say that it's meaningless rather than it carries its meaning in its own way and on its own terms. And I really think the only way to understand that meaning is by looking and letting go of thinking.''

Again there is truth in what the artist says, but I can't agree wholeheartedly. I'm not going to argue with an artist about whether or not there is intended meaning in a work. That's for the artist alone to know, and share if he likes. Of course, content, meaning, comes through regardless of an artist's intentions. I appreciate Frame's emphasis on looking, but I'm not certain why letting go of thinking needs to be part of viewing art.

I do agree that our own roots, preconceptions, baggage as it were impede looking. If he means that we should let go of or carefully moderate these sometime hindrances while viewing a sculpture or painting I agree. If he's suggesting that we should check our intellect at the door of the gallery, I disagree.

Julie reflection

1. For me, "looking and letting go of thinking" is NOT about checking out, it's literally just that… letting go of thinking. Of that compulsion to think, to process, to categorize, to compare, to undertake any of those operations we use in order to make sense of something that is new or strange, in order to make it known, to find how it fits with what is known. I found in the video simply an invitation to look, and to experience looking. Not to think at it too much or try to define it too much, but just kind of absorb it as it is. Sure, it's fun to hammer away with associations and definitions and get this cloud of thoughts going on. But the thing is the thing; I understand what he meant by saying it has to be experienced on its own terms.

   One of the things I keep working on is to understand whatever-I-make as it is. Partly to be critical of it. Partly to get outside my own ideas and expectations and take a look at what I really ended up with. Let go of what I thought I was making at the time and figure out what I actually made. Encounter it from a position of otherness, without expectation or preconception.

2- The Value of Art for the Preschool Child

http://www.education.com/reference/article/value-art-preschool-children/

Print

Collect It!

Email

By C. Seefeldt|B.A. Wasik Pearson Allyn Bacon Prentice Hall

Updated on Jul 20, 2010

Art is basic. Of course, every subject area is important, but no program for young children could succeed without emphasizing art. Through making, looking at, and talking about their own artwork and the art of others, three-, four-, and five-year-old children are doing the following:

- Expressing their feelings and emotions in a safe way. They learn to control their emotions and recognize that they can express and handle negative as well as joyous feelings through positive action.
- Practicing and gaining fine muscle control and strengthening eye-hand motor coordination. By holding paintbrushes and learning how to control paint, crayons, scissors, and other art tools, children gain the skills necessary for later writing activities as well as a feeling of control over themselves and their world.
- Developing perceptual abilities. Awareness of colors, shapes, forms, lines, and textures result as children observe these and try to replicate them through art.
- Being given the opportunity to make choices and solve problems. How do you get the legs to stick on a clay figure? What color should I use? Making art offers children a multitude of choices and many decisions to make.
- Seeing that others have differing points of view and ways of expressing these than they do. Comparing children's drawings, paintings, or models gives children concrete, dramatic examples of how different people express the same thing in different ways. While learning that their way is not the only way, they learn to value diversity (Strasser, 2001).
- Becoming aware of the idea that, through art, culture is transmitted. Becoming acquainted with the art of the past, children are involved in learning something of their origins and themselves.
- Experiencing success. Because art leaves the end open to the creator, all children experience a measure of success. This is why art activities are appropriate for children with special needs. Regardless of the physical or mental need of the child, there is some art media and activity through which he or she can experience success.
- Making connections between the visual arts and other disciplines. Art integrates the curriculum. Content from every subject matter can find form through art.

Mathematics. Children become aware of different sizes, shapes, and parallel lines and use every mathematical concept as they discuss their art and the art of others.

Science. Paint changes texture as it dries, powdered paint and chalk dissolve in water, and chalk produces bubbles when dipped in water. Also, paints change color when they are mixed together. The physical sciences are ever present as children produce art.

Economics. This and other concepts from the social studies develop. Children become producers by making art and consumers by using the materials of art.

Language. Children learn to talk about their art and the art of others and develop the vocabulary of art.

Beginning reading. Children make and read symbols that represent reality.

Social skills. By sharing paints and paper, cooperating to create a group mural or other project, and assuming responsibility for cleaning up, children gain valuable social skills through making art.

3- ***Art as Experience***

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search

Art as Experience (1934) is John Dewey's major writing on aesthetics, originally delivered as the first William James Lecturer at Harvard (1932). Dewey's aesthetics have been found useful in a number of disciplines, including the new media.

Dewey had previously written articles on aesthetics in the 1880s and had further addressed the matter in *Democracy and Education* (1915). In his major work, *Experience and Nature* (1925), he laid out the beginnings of a theory of aesthetic experience, and wrote two important essays for *Philosophy and Civilization* (1931).[1]

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Dewey's theory, here, is an attempt to shift the understandings of what is important and characteristic about the art process from its physical manifestations in the 'expressive object' to the process in its entirety, a process whose fundamental element is no longer the material 'work of art' but rather the development of an 'experience'. An experience is something that personally affects your life. That is why these theories are so important to our social and educational life.

Such a change in emphasis does not imply, though, that the individual art object has lost significance; far from it, its primacy is clarified: the object is recognized as the primary site for the dialectical processes of experience, as the unifying occasion for these experiences. Through the expressive object, the artist and the active observer encounter each other, their material and mental environments, and their culture at large.

The description of the actual act of experiencing is drawn heavily from the biological/psychological theories Dewey expounded in his development of functional psychology. In Dewey's article on reflex arc psychology, he writes that sensory data and worldly stimulus enter into the individual via the channels of afferent sense organs, and that the perception of these stimuli are a 'summation':

This sensory motor coordination is not a new act, supervening upon what preceded. Just as the response is necessary to constitute the stimulus, to determine it as sound and as this kind of sound…so the sound experience must persist as a value in the running, to keep it up, to control it. The motor reaction involved in the running is, once more, into, not merely to, the sound. It occurs to change the sound…The resulting quale, whatever it may be, has its meaning wholly determined by reference to the hearing of the sound. It is that experience mediated.[2]

The biological sensory exchange between man, whom Dewey calls 'the Live Creature' in *Art as Experience*, and the environment, is the basis of his aesthetic theory:

...An experience is a product, one might almost say bi-product, of continuous and cumulative interaction of an organic self with the world. There is no other foundation upon which esthetic theory and criticism can build.[3]

This is a dramatic expansion of the bounds of aesthetic philosophy, for it demonstrates the connections of art with everyday experience and in doing so reminds us of the highest responsibilities that art and society and the individual have always owed to each other:

...works of art are the most intimate and energetic means of aiding individuals to share in the arts of living. Civilization is uncivil because human beings are divided into non-communicating sects, races, nations, classes and cliques.[4]

To emphasize what is aesthetic about an experience is not, finally, to emphasize what is apolitical or impractical or otherwise marginal about that experience; rather, it is to emphasize in what ways that experience, as aesthetic, is a 'manifestation, a record and celebration of the life of a civilization, a means for promoting its development' and, insofar as that aesthetic experience relates to the kinds of experiences had in general, it is also the 'ultimate judgment upon the quality of a civilization.'[5]

See his *Experience and Nature* for an extended discussion of 'Experience' in Dewey's philosophy.

Chapters[edit source | edit]

The Live Creature[edit source | edit]

John Dewey offers a new theory of art and the aesthetic experience. Dewey proposes that there is a continuity between the refined experience of works of art and everyday activities and events, and in order to understand the aesthetic one must begin with the events and scenes of daily life. This idea stands in opposition to the aesthetic theories presented by Immanuel Kant and also the proponents of German Idealism, which have historically been shown to favor certain heavily-classicized forms of art, known commonly as 'High Art' or Fine Art. Dewey argues for the validity of 'popular art' stating:

So extensive and subtly pervasive are the ideas that set art on upon a remote pedestal, that many a person would be repelled rather than pleased if told that he enjoyed his casual recreations, at least in part, because of their esthetic quality. The arts which today have most vitality for the average person are the things he does not take to be arts; for instance, the movie, jazzed music, the comic strip...[6]

We must recover the continuity of aesthetic experience with the normal processes of living. It is the duty of the theorist to make this connection and its implications clear. If art were understood differently by the public, art would gain in public esteem and have wider appeal.

The task is to restore confidence between the refined and intensified forms of experience that are works of art and the everyday events, doings, and sufferings that are universally recognized to constitute experience.[7]

His criticism of existing theories is that they "spiritualize" art and sever its connection with everyday experience. Glorifying art and setting it on a pedestal separates it from community life. Such theories actually do harm by preventing people from realizing the artistic value of their daily activities and the popular arts (movies, jazz, newspaper accounts of sensational exploits) that they most enjoy, and drives away the aesthetic perceptions which are a necessary ingredient of happiness.

Art has aesthetic standing only as it becomes an experience for human beings. Art intensifies the sense of immediate living, and accentuates what is valuable in enjoyment. Art begins with

happy absorption in activity. Anyone who does his work with care, such as artists, scientists, mechanics, craftsmen, etc., are artistically engaged. The aesthetic experience involves the passing from disturbance to harmony and is one of man's most intense and satisfying experiences.

Art cannot be relegated to museums. There are historic reasons for the compartmentalization of art into museums and galleries. Capitalism, nationalism and imperialism have all played a major role.

The Live Creature and Ethereal Things[edit source | edit]

The title of the chapter is taken from John Keats who once wrote, in a letter[8] to Benjamin Robert Haydon,

The Sun, the Moon, the Earth and its contents are material to form greater things, that is, ethereal things- greater things than the Creator himself has made.[9]

In Dewey, this statement can be taken several ways: the term 'ethereal' is used in reference to the theorists of idealist aesthetics and other schools that have equated art with elements inaccessible to sense and common experience because of their perceived transcendent, spiritual qualities. This serves as a further condemnation of aesthetic theory that unjustly elevates art too far above the pragmatic, experiential roots that it is drawn from.

Another interpretation of the phrase could be that the 'earth and its contents' being, presumably, the ingredients to form 'ethereal things' further expounds the idea of Dewey's pragmatist aesthetics. In other words, the 'earth and its contents' could refer to 'human experience' being used to create art, (the 'ethereal things') which, though derived from the earth and experience, still contains a godly, creative quality not inherent in original creation.

Apart from organs inherited from animal ancestry, ideas and purpose would be without a mechanism of realization...the intervention of consciousness adds regulation, power of selection, and redisposition...its intervention leads to the idea of art as a conscious idea- the greatest intellectual achievement in the history of humanity.[10]

Addressing the intrusion of the supernatural into art, mythology, and religious ceremony, Dewey defends the need for the esoteric in addition to pure rationalism. Furthermore, the human imagination is seen by Dewey to be a powerful synthesizing tool to express experience with the environment. Essentially, rationality alone can neither suffice to understand life completely or ensure an enriched existence.

Dewey writes that religious behaviors and rituals were

enduringly enacted, we may be sure, in spite of all practical failures, because they were immediate enhancements of the experience of living…delight in the story, in the growth and

rendition of a good yarn, played its dominant part then as it does in the growth of popular mythologies today.[11]

Art and (aesthetic) mythology, according to Dewey, is an attempt to find light in a great darkness. Art appeals directly to sense and the sensuous imagination, and many aesthetic and religious experiences occur as the result of energy and material used to expand and intensify the experience of life.

Returning to Keats, Dewey closes the chapter by making reference to another of Keat's passages,[12]

Beauty is truth, and truth beauty—that is all ye know on Earth, and all ye need to know.[13]

Concerning the passage, Dewey addresses the doctrine of divine revelation and the role of the imagination in experience and art.

Reasoning must fail man—this of course is the doctrine long taught by those who have held the necessity of divine revelation. Keats did not accept this supplement and substitute for reason. The insight of the imagination must suffice...ultimately there are but two philosophies. One of them accepts life and experience in all its uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and half knowledge and turns that experience upon itself to deepen and intensify its own qualities—to imagination and art. This is the philosophy of Shakespeare and Keats.[14]

Having an Experience[edit source | edit]

John Dewey distinguishes between experience in general and "an" experience. Experience occurs continually, as we are always involved in the process of living, but it is often interrupted and inchoate, with conflict and resistance. Much of the time we are not concerned with the connection of events but instead there is a loose succession, and this is non-aesthetic. Experience, however, is not an experience.

An experience occurs when a work is finished in a satisfactory way, a problem solved, a game is played through, a conversation is rounded out, and fulfillment and consummation conclude the experience. In an experience, every successive part flows freely. An experience has a unity and episodes fuse into a unity, as in a work of art. The experience may have been something of great or just slight importance.

Such an experience has its own individualizing quality. Experiences are individual and singular, each having its own beginning and end, its own plot, and its own singular quality that pervades the entire experience. The final import is intellectual, but the occurrence is emotional as well. Aesthetic experience cannot be sharply marked off from other experiences, but in an aesthetic experience, structure may be immediately felt and recognized, there is completeness and unity and necessarily emotion. Emotion is the moving and cementing force.

There is no one word to combine "artistic" and "aesthetic," unfortunately, but "artistic" refers to the production, the doing and making, and "aesthetic" to appreciating, perceiving, and enjoying. For a work to be art, it must also be aesthetic. The work of the artist is to build an experience that will be experienced aesthetically.

The Act of Expression[edit source | edit]

Artistic expression is not "spontaneous." The mere spewing forth of emotion is not artistic expression. Art requires long periods of activity and reflection, and comes only to those absorbed in observing experience. An artist's work requires reflection on past experience and a sifting of emotions and meanings from that prior experience. For an activity to be converted into an artistic expression, there must be excitement, turmoil and an urge from within to go outward. Art is expressive when there is complete absorption in the subject and a unison of present and past experience is achieved.

There are values and meanings best expressed by certain visible or audible material. Our appetities know themselves better when artistically transfigured. Artistic expression clarifies turbulent emotions. The process is essentially the same in scientists and philosophers as well as those conventionally defined as artists. Aesthetic quality will adhere to all modes of production in a well-ordered society.

The Expressive Object[edit source | edit]

In the fifth chapter Dewey turns to the expressive object. He believes that the object should not be seen in isolation from the process that produced it, nor from the individuality of vision from which it came. Theories which simply focus on the expressive object dwell on how the object represents other objects and ignore the individual contribution of the artist. Conversely, theories that simply focus on the act of expressing tend to see expression merely in terms of personal discharge.

Works of art use materials that come from a public world, and they awaken new perceptions of the meanings of that world, connecting the universal and the individual organically. The work of art is representative, not in the sense of literal reproduction, which would exclude the personal, but in that it tells people about the nature of their experience.

Dewey observes that some who have denied art meaning have done so on the assumption that art does not have connection with outside content. He agrees that art has a unique quality, but argues that this is based on its concentrating meaning found in the world. For Dewey, the actual Tintern Abbey expresses itself in Wordsworth's poem about it and a city expresses itself in its celebrations. In this, he is quite different from those theorists who believe that art expresses the inner emotions of the artist. The difference between art and science is that art expresses meanings, whereas science states them. A statement gives us directions for obtaining an experience, but does not supply us with experience. That water is H2O tells us how to obtain

or test for water. If science expressed the inner nature of things it would be in competition with art, but it does not. Aesthetic art, by contrast to science, constitutes an experience.

A poem operates in the dimension of direct experience, not of description or propositional logic. The expressiveness of a painting is the painting itself. The meaning is there beyond the painter's private experience or that of the viewer. A painting by Van Gogh of a bridge is not representative of a bridge or even of Van Gogh's emotion. Rather, by means of pictorial presentation, Van Gogh presents the viewer with a new object in which emotion and external scene are fused. He selects material with a view to expression, and the picture is expressive to the degree that he succeeds.

Organization of Energies[edit source | edit]

Energy pervades the work of art, and the more that energy is clarified, intensified, and concentrated, the more compelling the work of art should be. Dewey gives the example of youg children intending to act a play. “They gesticulate, tumble and roll, each pretty much on his own account, with little reference to what others are doing.” This is contrasted with the “well-constructed and well-executed” play. However, it does not necessarily follow that the latter play will be better than the former. This is merely an extreme case of contrasting aesthetic values based on different organizations of energy. The organization of energy manifests itself in patterns or intervals, now more now less. This patterning is related to Dewey’s earlier ideas on rhythm. He writes that instances of energy are “piecemeal, one replacing another…And thus we are brought again to rhythm.” However, the organization of energies is not the same as rhythm. The organization of energy is important as “the common element in all the arts” for “producing a result.” Artistic skill exemplifies skillful organization of energy. An over-emphasis of a single source of energy (at the expense of others sources of energy) in a work of art shows poor organization of energy. At the end of the chapter, Dewey states that art is, in fact, “only definable as organization of energies.” The power of art to “move and stir, to calm and tranquilize” is intelligible only when “the fact of energy” is made central to an understanding of art. The qualities of order and balance in works of art follow from the selection of significant energy. Great art, therefore, finds and deploys ideal energy.

In the final paragraphs, Dewey summarizes the chapter. He claims that there must be common substance in the arts “because there are general conditions without which an experience is not possible.” Ultimately, then, it is the person experiencing the artwork who must distinguish and appreciate these common qualities, for “the intelligibility of a work of art depends upon the presence to the meaning that renders individuality of parts and their relationship in the whole directly present to the eye and ear trained in perception.”

The Varied Substance of the Arts[edit source | edit]
The Human Contribution[edit source | edit]
The Challenge to Philosophy[edit source | edit]
Criticism and Perception[edit source | edit]
Art and Civilization[edit source | edit]
Notes[edit source | edit]

1. ^ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2. ^ [1]
3. ^ *Art as Experience* p. 220
4. ^ *Art as Experience* p. 336
5. ^ Art as Experience p. 326
6. ^ *Art as Experience* p. 06
7. ^ *Art as Experience* p. 03
8. ^ [2]
9. ^ *Art as Experience* p.20
10. ^ *Art as Experience* p. 25
11. ^ *Art as Experience* p.30
12. ^ [3]
13. ^ *Ode on a Grecian Urn*
14. ^ *Art as Experience* p.34

4- Surveying Aesthetics & Astronomy: A Project Exploring the Public's Perception of Astronomical Images and the Science Within

http://astroart.cfa.harvard.edu/

Summary

Every year hundreds of astronomical images are released to the general public from the many telescopes both on the ground and in space that observe the Universe. These images cover both data gathered at visible wavelengths and other phenomena at wavelengths that cannot be detected by the human eye, so that the entire electromagnetic spectrum is represented. The release of astronomical images raises major questions about the dissemination and communication of that knowledge, including: how do non-experts (i.e., the public) perceive these images? In 2008, the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory began a unique research study — dubbed the Aesthetics & Astronomy (A&A) project — to examine the perception of multi-wavelength astronomical imagery and the effects of the various scientific and artistic choices in processing astronomical data. This article provides a brief synopsis of the results of the initial A&A study and its possible implications for astronomy outreach professionals. This article concludes with an overview of the latest study (in progress, 2010).

Aesthetics is the study of how human beings react in a sensory and emotional fashion to the things we encounter in life, especially as being appealing or not appealing. (Smith & Smith, 2010)

Introduction

Aesthetics — from a psychological per- spective — is the study of all things beauti- ful, whether art or not, and all things art, whether beautiful or not.

Astronomy is one of the most visual of the sciences. Modern astronomy images capture the Universe not only with the narrow range of wavelengths that humans can detect with their eyes, but also with radio, infrared, X-ray electromagnetic radiation and more. From small telescopes wielded by amateurs to multi-billion dollar observatories controlled by professionals, astronomy has the capacity to lure us in by the sheer aesthetics of its data.

Every year, hundreds of astronomical images are released to the public by tel- escopes of all kinds both on the ground and in space. This represents a consider- able investment — in both human and monetary terms — by the astronomical community. A small cottage industry, so to speak, straddling the worlds of astronomy and science communication has grown to produce and disseminate these images. Today, more than ever, these images are shared via traditional media (like news- papers, magazines, books, prints, etc.), planetariums and science museums, but also through websites, Twitter and the blogosphere, directly with the public.

But the question is: how good are we at what we are intending to do?

To our knowledge, there has never been a rigorous academic study to answer how well our choices in our image pipelines — from processing to dissemination — do in reaching the widest possible audience. We conceived the A&A to begin to tackle this void. The original A&A study was designed to probe how effective these choices (or compromises) are when it comes to sci- ence versus aesthetics in astronomical images.

The A&A team consists of a unique com- bination of professional astronomy com- municators, astrophysicists and aesthetics experts from the discipline of psychology. In late 2008, the A&A team conducted both online studies (see Figure 2) and a series of in-person focus groups. The research questions were designed to test:

• H ow much do variations in terms of presentation of colour, explanation and scale affect comprehension of astronomical images?

• W hat are the differences between vari- ous populations (experts, novices, stu- dents) in terms of what they learn from the images?

• What misconceptions do the non- experts have about astronomy and the images they are exposed to?

Highlights from the 2008 study

It was a pleasant surprise, when over 8000 usable responses were collected in just over a week in the online survey. The full results from the project were accepted by the SAGE Journal of Science Communication in August 2010 (see Smith at al., 2010, for more detail on the meth- odology, data limitations, descriptive sta- tistics of the study and a full reference list).

The online participants ranked themselves along a scale from “novice” to “expert”. There were some predictable differences among the groups. For example, the nov- ices indicated that variations in terms of presentation of colour, explanation and scale affected their comprehension of the imagery. Those who identified themselves as expert, on the other hand, wanted shorter, more technical explanations (with scale information). Other less obvious results also emerged, including that the novices said that their aesthetic enjoyment increased solely based on their ability to access the information in the accompany- ing caption.

Some additional outcomes include:

• Providing a context for the image is critical to comprehension, particularly for novices.

pages with click-tracking methods to count the user clicks per question and per image, and to compare totals. We have also created a similar implementation for a series of print products that includes posters featuring multi-wavelength astro- nomical images (see Figure 3). Here, we use the tried and true series of questions: who, what, when, where, why and how to engage the viewer in an approachable manner. The text addresses some of the questions that were commonly asked dur- ing the focus groups, including how the images were made, the historical impor- tance of the object, the location in the night sky, etc. Data collection and a brief summative evaluation of these six posters are being conducted to analyse the impact of the improved features on the public’s understanding.

Other recommendations from the original A&A findings showed that it is useful (and not overwhelming for the reader) to pro- vide colour code keys and physical scales in images intended for the public. Another useful finding has been that many novices want to understand how the experts — the

• E xperts prefer text that is shorter and to the point; novices prefer a more nar- rative expository style for the text that accompanies images.

• P roviding a sense of scale to go with objects is helpful for comprehension at all levels of expertise.

• E xperts and novices view space images very differently. Novices begin with more of a sense of awe and won- der, and focus first more on the aes- thetic qualities of the image. Experts wonder how the image was produced, what information is being presented in the image, and what the creators of the image wanted to convey.

• E xperts are much more likely to see blue as hot than are novices; about 80% of novices see red as hot com- pared to 60% of experts.

Putting the preliminary results into practice

Since this A&A group is led by members of the Chandra X-ray Observatory's Edu- cation and Public Outreach (EPO) group we could implement the study's results almost immediately. As two of us (Arcand & Watzke) are responsible for a major observatory's public website and other outreach materials, the A&A outcomes to could go quickly from preliminary aca- demic research to field-tested practices on a website that receives 250 000-300 000 visits per month.

What changes did we make? First, we added bulleted text for each new image, interactive labelling and put "Wikipedia- style" links in the body of the text. Each of these changes came out of the feedback we received during the online survey and focus groups.

The next, more involved implementation of the A&A results was to develop an interac- tive multi-wavelength image feature that allows the user to move from one energy band to another, and ultimately "build" the composite themselves. A sample of this can be found online .

The feedback on these relatively simple changes to the website from the public through our comment and rating sections has been overwhelmingly positive. Our next step is to implement a questionnaire on the Chandra website to ask users specifically how these new features affect their enjoyment and comprehension of an image and the science behind it.

We have also built an interactive, question- based text script into the Chandra photo pages with click-tracking methods to count the user clicks per question and per image, and to compare totals. We have also created a similar implementation for a series of print products that includes posters featuring multi-wavelength astro- nomical images (see Figure 3). Here, we use the tried and true series of questions: who, what, when, where, why and how to engage the viewer in an approachable manner. The text addresses some of the questions that were commonly asked dur- ing the focus groups, including how the images were made, the historical impor- tance of the object, the location in the night sky, etc. Data collection and a brief summative evaluation of these six posters are being conducted to analyse the impact of the improved features on the public's understanding.

Other recommendations from the original A&A findings showed that it is useful (and not overwhelming for the reader) to pro- vide colour code keys and physical scales in images intended for the public. Another useful finding has been that many novices want to understand how the experts — the astrophysicists — view the images. This type of information could be provided with images in the future by having a "rollover" on the image that annotates, "Here is what astronomers see…", or by including video or audio commentary from astrono- mers, available as supplementary digital material.

Current & future plans

We are currently conducting a series of studies, funded in part by a grant from the Smithsonian Institution, that ask view- ers to evaluate astronomical images with their corresponding

descriptions across different media platforms: web, mobile, traditional print and large format print. The images being used include some from the Chandra X-ray Observatory, Hubble Space Telescope, Spitzer Space Telescope, Solar Dynamics Observatory and others. Work- ing with museum professionals and sci- ence centre partners we have produced a travelling exhibit of the material. Touring through six locations in 2010, this exhibit allows participants to access the astro- nomical imagery and text through tradi- tionally sized and large-scale prints. The schedule of locations is available online .

An online study of the same material tests the user's perceptions on mobile devices in comparison with traditional online plat- forms. We will also be employing in-person focus groups this autumn to explore the aesthetics-context correlation further, across all four of the platforms. Questions on the interpretation of scientific principles (perception of temperature, for example), aesthetic appeal, and the interpretation of unfamiliar (meaning non-terrestrial) objects are being included in all forms of the study.

Conclusion

We believe that we, the professional astro- nomical community, are operating in an unusual age. At the moment, we are the beneficiaries of a multitude of fantastic tel- escopes and observatories. It is our goal to communicate these exciting discoveries to the public, and, quite often, the images are our greatest asset in doing this. At the same time, however, there is much discus- sion about "false colour" and what is "real" in this age of Photoshop and other digital manipulation. With so much data and so many tools at our disposal, not to mention the potential wide reach of the internet, are we employing all of the possible best prac- tices? Can studies such as A&A uncover ways to help dispel some of the misinfor- mation that exists about the veracity and legitimacy of what we distribute to the pub- lic? There are many lines of research we can follow and many unknowns to explore. We invite anyone who is interested in these issues to contact us.

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Links

1 http://chandra.si.edu/photo/2009/galactic/ 2 http://astroart.cfa.harvard.edu/ 3 http://chandra.si.edu/mobile/aa.html

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5- Great Contemporary Works of Political Art

By Marina Galperina on Oct 23, 2012 4:00pm

http://flavorwire.com/339858/10-contemporary-works-of-political-art-that-work

Some artists aren't moved by the beauty around them, their patrons' sponsorship, or some deep need for catharsis. Some artists operate on a different wavelength, channeling the injustices, imbalances, and harsh realities of their daily lives or the lives of those in need to create their art. That's not to say these artists are entirely motivated by altruism. Suppose they get self-satisfaction from sticking it to the man, from pointing to the bad guys with a big giant neon sign, from being badasses themselves. Nonetheless, kudos. In the wake of the freshly concluded presidential debates, here are a few recent art projects made with a political message in mind. From the Yes Men to Ai Weiwei to the Guerrilla Girls — these artists employ more tools than one can pick up at the neighborhood art store. Check out their culture-jamming, intervention-throwing, order-disrupting, and trouble-making ways, and see if it inspires you to stand for something.

Global Agenda Council on the Role of the Arts in Society 2013

http://www.weforum.org/content/global-agenda-council-role-arts-society-2013

Issue Overview

From visual arts to literature and music to dramatic performance, the arts exert a powerful influence on societal development. Artists often challenge commonly held perspectives with innovative thinking. They raise awareness about social issues, break down barriers to cross-cultural understanding and global dialogue, and inspire creative ideas.

Artists worldwide are important agents of change. Numerous examples demonstrate this fact, such as musical collaboration between opposing sides in conflict zones, therapeutic art to relieve psychological trauma and theatrical productions to promote community regeneration.

In times of financial and political instability, often the arts and culture domains are the first to suffer. Not only does a funding issue impact these institutions, but also the artists themselves have to turn to other occupations to survive. Without them, society loses an important element of its social capital, as well as a part of its history and future.

The endangered nature of the arts and the importance of keeping cultural values at the centre of our economies and societies are gaining recognition. However, the potential of the arts to succeed where traditional policies have failed warrants further examination and support.

Some of the priorities to be addressed include:

- Integrating artists into multistakeholder discussions to find creative solutions to global challenges
- Supporting public art projects to enhance community engagement
- Building cross-cultural dialogue through the arts
- Protecting world heritage for future generations

Did You Know?

- In the USA, non-profit arts organizations generate US$ 135 billion in economic activity annually, supporting 4.1 million jobs and generating US$ 22.3 billion in government revenue.
- In 1995, Taiwan launched the Community Construction Movement, a long-term programme to revitalize local communities. Since then, 25 museums devoted to Taiwan's indigenous groups have been established and now play a crucial role in the creation of a collective memory.
- University of Pennsylvania researchers have demonstrated that a high concentration of the arts in a city leads to higher civic engagement, more social cohesion, higher child welfare and lower poverty rates.
- Numerous studies affirm that students who receive music education in school improve their SAT and ACT scores in math, foreign language and creative writing.

Quotes

"Arts are not the icing on the cake, but much more the yeast, and such a significant language for change."
Mallika Sarabhai, Dancer and Director, Darpana Academy of Performing Arts, India

"I go to the ordinary people to hear their voices and to hear their plight. And through my music and the arts and the platform that I have, I am able to disseminate this information to the powers that be."
Yvonne Chaka Chaka, Singer and President, Princess of Africa Foundation, South Africa

"Art has always been a mirror of society. Art reflects society, art criticizes it, and art always offers solutions to problems in society."
Senam Okudzeto, Artist, Founder and Director, Art in Social Structures, Ghana

Council Insights

The Council aims to accelerate and innovate ways the arts can be harnessed as a force for societal change. The 2012-14 term will focus on three strategic areas:

- Documenting and disseminating best practice case studies (through an interactive Web portal) of using the arts for global change, by interacting with business, government and civil society
- The Council views the arts as an underutilized force of transformation; through best practice examples, non-artists can better integrate these into their objectives. In the business sector, the portal can highlight examples of using the arts for human resource development, education, training, innovation and a platform for engaging with society.
- Integrating the arts into programming at Forum events, to demonstrate the transformative effect of art in considering challenges and opportunities on the global stage
- Subsequent to the Council's belief that the arts are underutilized, the Forum provides a platform for government, business and civil society leaders to experience first-hand the transformative power of the arts. The Forum is also well positioned to be an example of how the arts are critical in the development of empathy, self-actualization and a coherent vision for the future in countries around the world. Artists will also benefit personally, by being part of the Forum programming, giving their work a wider audience and contributing to the debates on the future state of the world.
- Working in partnership with other Global Agenda Councils to shift consciousness on the power of arts for social change across issues and geographical lines
- The Council recognizes the opportunity to integrate the arts into other critical issues; by collaborating with other Councils, this Network can be leveraged to develop groundbreaking partnerships not often available.

Further resources

Making the case for the arts in society
Living as Form: Socially Engaged Art from 1991-2011, Ed. Nato Thompson, Creative Time Books, 2012
Annual Meeting of the New Champions, Closing Plenary - Arts and Culture in Society is mentioned at 38'45''
Wasteland, a documentary film
A Motherland Tour: A Journey of African Women with Yvonne Chaka Chaka, a documentary film

6- Review: Deeper than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art

The first page of the PDF of this article appears below.

http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/116/461/209.extract

odological constraint to the extent that they could. This book, however, should certainly go some way toward remedying that, and providing a reason for looking again at common-sense.

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Deeper than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art, by Jenefer Robinson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 515. H/b $74.00.

Jenefer Robinson's *Deeper than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art* refreshingly draws upon evidence from psychology and neurology to offer a philosophical analysis of the role of emotions in our experience of art. Robinson develops a non-cognitive theory of emotion and applies it to the various arts, using it, for example, to justify the claim that literature has an educative value and to explain the emotional impact of music.

Robinson sets out to challenge cognitive theories of the emotions, which privilege judgement or some other type of cognition as essential to an emotion. Although accepting the cognitivist view that emotion necessarily involves an evaluation of an object's relation to our desires, goals, and values, she argues that emotional arousal is not primarily a cognitive matter. Instead, arousal occurs when an affect program, an automatic set of physiological and behavioural responses to something in the environment, is set in motion.

Cognitive judgements, according to Robinson, are insufficient to induce an emotion. One can cognitively judge that one has been offended, for example, but not emotionally take umbrage; one might merely note the fact. By contrast, the kind of judgement that inevitably results in emotion is an 'affective appraisal', which notes some object or event that matters to the organism, thereby triggering a set of responses that proceed automatically.

> … the function of an affective appraisal is to alert the agent very fast and automatically to whatever in the (external or internal) environment is of significance to the agent's well-being, and to produce instantly a physiological state that readies the agent for appropriate action and signals to others the state of the agent. (p. 197)

Affective appraisal occurs prior to cognitive appraisal, according to Robinson. She accepts the evolutionary argument that emotion was naturally selected as a means of prompting appropriate responses to threats, and that given the importance of rapid response in the presence of real dangers, automatic affect programs are of greater survival benefit than any consciously mediated reaction could be.

7- Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 4, No. 2, August 2007

EXPRESSION AND EXPRESSIVENESS IN ART

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I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of expression in the arts is Janus-faced. On the one hand expression is an author-centered notion: many Romantic poets, painters, and musicians thought of themselves as pouring our or ex-pressing their own emotions in their artworks. And on the other hand, expression is an audience-centered notion, the communication of what is expressed by an author to members of an audience. Typically the word "expression" is used for the author-centered aspect of expression as a whole, and the word "expressiveness" is used for the audience-centered aspect, and I shall keep to this usage. In this paper I shall argue that although expression is closely related to expressiveness, the two concepts are distinct and, in particular, expressiveness cannot be analyzed in terms of expression, as has been recently suggested by Stephen Davies and Jerrold Levinson. Nonetheless, the richest examples of expression in the arts involve both expression and expressiveness.

Both expression and expressiveness are concepts that have their home in ordinary life and are then extended to the arts. I begin by giving a brief account of artistic expression, and then turn to artistic expressiveness.

II. EXPRESSION

In ordinary life, an expression of emotion is a piece of behavior that (1) issues from somebody or other who is actually experiencing the emotion, and (2) manifests or reveals that emotion in such a way that other people can perceive the emotion in t he behavior. Artistic expression has the same basic structure and function as expression in ordinary life. That's why it is properly called "expression." The Romantic poets, painters, and composers who talked of themselves as expressing their emotions in

their works thought of themselves as revealing in their artworks the emotions that they themselves were actually experiencing or remembering experiencing and thereby enabling other people (and maybe themselves as well) to understand what it is to be in that emotional state. 1 R.G. Collingwood gave the classic formulation of this view:

When a man is said to express an emotion, what is being said about him comes to this. At first, he is conscious of having an emotion, but not conscious of what this emotion is. All he is conscious of is a perturbation or excitement … From this helpless and oppressed condition he extricates himself by doing something which we call expressing himself. 2

In some cases it is clear that an expression of emotion in art is just like an expression of emotion in life. If the histrionic teenager down the road were to say sincerely and seriously, "I fall upon the thorns of life! I bleed!" the utterance would be an expression of emotion , a painful emotion of frustration and despair, just as it is in Shelley's poem. Artistic expressions are expressions primarily because they issue or at least seem to issue from somebody or other who is actually experiencing the emotion. The work provides evidence that the person is experiencing (or has experienced) the emotion. As Bruce Vermazen puts the point, when "faced with a putative … object," that expresses emotion, the interpreter "imagines that the object has been uttered by someone, ... and then asks himself what mental economy would be behind such an utterance, what properties of an utterer would make it appropriate to utter just such an object as this." 3

The utterance I have just quoted from the Shelley poem is an expression of emotion in the dramatic protagonist of the poem, but in this instance it is very likely to be an expression of emotion in the author of the poem as well: it seems to issue from some state of frustration and despair that is being experienced by the protagonist, whom we have good reason to identify with Shelley himself. Sometimes, however, it's a character in an artwork that is doing the expressing, as when King Lear

1 Cf. Wordsworth (1802): “Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” that are “recollected in tranquillity.” 2 Collingwood (1963), pp. 109-110. 3 Vermazen (1986), pp. 208-9. Vermazen actually says “When faced with a putative expressive object…” but I am trying here to distinguish an expressive object from one that expresses emotion in e.g. the maker of the object. Vermazen’s account, as his title suggests, is an account of expression in art, not expressiveness.

expresses his rage, his frustration, his disgust with the world and his despair, or when the Madonna in Grunewald’s Crucifixion

http://www.artchive.com/artchive/G/grunewald/grunwld1.jpg.html

expresses in face and gesture her anguish at the death of Christ. Sometimes it is a narrator or an “implied author” 4 who expresses the emotion, as the implied author of Jane Austen’s novels (who in this case is also their narrator) expresses her ironic amusement at the foibles of her characters. The important point is that in cases of genuine expression, there is always someone who is expressing an emotion that he or she is actually experiencing or has experienced. Where the agent expressing the emotion is imagined, he or she is imagined as expressing emotions that he or she actually experiences. This is not the only requirement on expression but it is a crucial one. Expression is fundamentally something that agents or imagined agents (implied artists, narrators or characters) do (or are imagined as doing).

In ordinary life, the expression of emotion can consist in physiological changes, including facial and vocal expressions, as well as gestures, posture, motor responses and “action tendencies” of approach or avoidance. It can also consist in the expression of a point of view on the world, as when angry people verbally express their sense of affront or fearful people describe the threats they see. Sometimes the emotion colors the whole world, as when in anger I see offenses all around me and in happy love I experience the whole world as my oyster. Expressions of emotion may then take a global form: “Everyone is deliberately insulting me!” or “The world is a

wonderful place!" In art we find analogues of many of these modes of emotional expression.

a. Expressing emotions by means of gestures, posture, facial expressions, and action tendencies

In most movies what's depicted is a "slice of life," and characters are depicted as expressing their emotions in all the ways that human beings can in ordinary life: in speech and action as well as in physiological changes, action tendencies, facial and vocal expressions, and so on. Representational paintings and sculptures, though

4 For the concept of the implied author see Booth (1961).

usually immobile, can express emotions by depicting people who are expressing their emotions in facial expression, posture, gestures, and action tendencies. The virile gestures of the Horatii in David's famous painting

http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/his/CoreArt/art/resourcesb/dav_oath.jpg

express their determination, optimism, and courage, whereas the droopy flaccid poses of their womenfolk express their tenderness and fearfulness (as well as their feminine helplessness and weakness). 5 Similarly, a sculpture can represent not only a person's facial expression but also the expression of emotion in posture and gestures, as when Rodin's Burghers of Calais

http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/fnart/rodin/rodin_calais.html

represents the six burghers as each expressing a very different emotion, ranging from fear to despair to anguish to heavy-heartedness to painful acceptance of their destiny. 6

Dance is the preeminent art of expression by bodily movement. Characters in a dance piece can express such emotions as tender love, prideful disdain, and abject terror by enacting postures and gestures, action tendencies and bodily movements characteristic of these emotions.

b. Expressing emotions by describing or representing a point of view The literary arts express emotions in a rather different way. 7 A poem in which the

dramatic speaker says “I fall upon the thorns of life! I bleed!” is a poem in which the dramatic speaker is verbally expressing his emotions of frustration and despair. 8 Lyric

poetry is full of such expressions, some specific and some more global. W hen Robert

Browning writes “Oh to be in England now that April’s there!” he is expressing his

nostalgia for the English Spring. Browning’s nostalgia is focused fairly narrowly, but

5 For an interesting recent account of expression in paintings, see Lopes (2005). 6 The sculpture is notable partly because none of the expressions it portrays are appropriate to heroes in a patriotic sculpture. 7 Although poetry may have, to some degree a “tone of voice,” reflected in how the poet seems to want the lines to be performed (slowly and heavily or brightly and chirpily, for example). Robert Stecker also comments on the contrast between expression in literature (in particular) and instrumental music (Stecker (1984)), although his conclusions are different from mine. 8 I say “his” because in this case there is reason to think that the speaker is a persona of the poet Shelley himself.

the dramatic speaker of the Ode to the West Wind appears to find all of life painful

and full of difficulties. In drama, characters frequently express their emotions verbally

as well as in gesture and posture. Song and opera raise special problems because they

are musical forms, but songs also verbally express the emotions of a protagonist, as in

lyric poetry or of characters, as in many ballads. In opera characters spend a great deal

of their singing time expressing their emotions.

A painting of the Crucifixion in which the Madonna is represented as expressing

her grief and anguish at the foot of the cross, does not necessarily express grief and

anguish itself (although it may). The way in which the artist has depicted the scene may instead express horror 9 at the cruelty inflicted on Christ, compassion for Christ’s

suffering and for that of his followers, or awe at one of the great Christian mysteries.(translations vary depending on each perciever)

In these cases the painting as a whole expresses not the emotions and attitudes of the

characters within the work but the emotions and attitudes of the (implied) maker of the painting. 10 We can see these emotions and attitudes in the point of view from

which the content of the painting is represented.

There are different ways in which an artist can express a point of view in an

artwork. When Shelley's protagonist cries, "I fall upon the thorns of life! I bleed!" he

is expressing his emotion(s) by articulating his "vision" of the world.

Representational paintings and photographs can do something similar. Richard

Wollheim cites Edwin Smith's photograph of Castle Stalker in Appin, Argyllshire as

an example of the way the world looks to a person in a melancholy state of mind. By

9 Ernst Gombrich describes Grünewald's Isenheim altarpiece as depicting the reality of the Crucifixion "in all its unmitigated horror." Grünewald provides "a sermon in pictures," proclaiming "the sacred truths as taught by the Church. The central panel of the Isenheim altarpiece shows that he sacrificed all other considerations to this one overriding aim. Of beauty, as the Italian artists saw it, there is none in this stark and cruel picture of the crucified Savior." Gombrich (1972), p. 270. 10 Guy Sircello has pointed out that artworks often express the artist's emotions and attitudes by means of what he calls the "artistic acts" in a work. For example, Poussin's Rape of the Sabine Women is an aloof , detached painting because, despite the violent subject matter, Poussin " observes " the scene of rape and pillage "in an aloof, detached way." Prokoviev's music for Peter's grandfather in Peter and the Wolf is witty because "the composer wittily comments on the character" in his music. Wordsworth's poem "We are Seven" is sentimental "because Wordsworth treats his subject matter sentimentally." Sircello (1972), p. 25.

representing the landscape as seen in a certain way, Smith manages to express the emotions of the artist who is apparently seeing the world in this way. 11

But artists can express their emotions not only by the way they depict a scene but

also by the way they manipulate their medium. Pollock's "action paintings" express

emotion because they seem to have been produced by actions or gestures that express the artist's (or his persona's) emotions. 12 The same effect can be achieved in

representational paintings. Thus some of Van Gogh's landscapes, for example,

express the way the world appears to the artist by means of his impassioned treatment

of the brooding menacing clouds, the tormented flame-like cypresses and the unsteadily gyrating earth. The paintings express Van Gogh's own anxiety, even terror.

http://www.ibiblio.org/wm/paint/auth/gogh/fields/ (expressing an artist's imotions coyld be manipulated by the medium used or the technique)

Different modes of expression can be combined. Kathe Kollwitz's etching Woman with Dead Child

http://www.mystudios.com/women/klmno/kollwitz_child.html

shows a mother apparently seated on the ground with legs crossed, holding her dead child in a close embrace. It shows the mother expressing desperate grief as well as love for her child, but it also expresses the artist's compassion for these people. Emil Nolde's paintings of dancing (such as Dance around the Golden Calf

http://www.artchive.com/artchive/N/nolde/golden_calf.jpg.html

11 Wollheim (1987), p. 80. Wollheim has in mind the spectator rather than the artist. He says that when we see a scene such as that depicted in the photograph, a "mood of loneliness and despair … creeps over us." (p. 81) He also recognizes those cases in which "we are in the grip of some strong or poignant emotion, and this emotion then comes to colour everything we set eyes on." (p. 81). Wollheim goes on to analyze "expressive perception" in terms of psychological projection, a move I would resist. In Deeper than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art , I show how Caspar David Friedrich's spiritual vision of the world is expressed by the point of view from which the (implied) artist depicts his landscapes. 12 As Kendall Walton has pointed out, the paintings have the look of having been produced by virtue of these actions. Walton (1979).

and Candle Dancers

http://www.artchive.com/artchive/N/nolde/candle_dancers.jpg.html)

show the dancers as dancing in a kind of ecstatic frenzy and thus expressing their frenzied and ecstatic state of mind, but at the same time the way Nolde paints seems itself to be frenzied and ecstatic, and his depiction of the dancers in this style expresses what is apparently his own ecstatic frenzy. So in painting the dancers in the

way that he does, Nolde both represents the dancers expressing their own emotions and expresses his own emotions towards the dancers.

In these examples, the artwork is said to express an emotion e just because the artist expresses an e-ish point of view in the work or paints in an e-ish way. 13 But there are other examples in which the point of view in the work expresses an emotion that it doesn't make sense to attribute to the work itself. Thus Constable's love of the English countryside, especially "all that lies on the banks of the Stour," is expressed in his work by his loving attention to "willows, old rotten planks, slimy posts, and brickwork." 14

http://www.huntington.org/Information/constable.htm

But the landscape paintings themselves do not love anything. Similarly, Keats' Ode on a Grecian Urn expresses yearning for a timeless world of art and beauty, but the poem itself doesn't yearn for anything.

c. Expression in Music

Many theorists have thought that there is a special problem with the expression of emotion in "pure" instrumental music, where there are apparently no agents doing the expressing as in song or opera,15 and where the behavior that expresses the emotion consists in playing music, which at first blush does not seem to be anything like any expressions of emotion in ordinary life. Of course, a piece of instrumental music can express attitudes or emotions in its (implied) author, as when we speak of Berlioz's

13 In Sircello's formulation, the artist performs an e-ish artistic act. 14 Quoted from Constable in Gombrich (1960), p. 324. 15 By contrast, since dance requires dancers, even abstract works of dance can potentially express emotions in the same way as works of dance that tell a story.

love for colorful orchestration or J. S. Bach's delight in intricate fugal patterns. But it seems as though expression of most of the sorts I have described, which is directly analogous to emotional expression in ordinary life, is just not possible.

However, both Edward T. Cone and Jerrold Levinson have independently argued that there are in fact good reasons for thinking that music should be heard as an

expression of emotion in an agent or persona in the music. As Cone points out, "a basic act of dramatic impersonation" underlies all poetry and literary fiction. 16 As we have just seen, even the most sincere poetic expression of emotion such as Shelley's is uttered by a dramatic speaker. Cone suggests that

> all music, like all literature, is dramatic; that every composition is an utterance depending on an act of impersonation which it is the duty of the performer or performers to make clear. 17

A lyric song is often an outpouring of emotion by a dramatic speaker/singer just like the lyric poem on which it is based. Both the poem "Gute Nacht," and the eponymous song from Schubert's Winterreise cycle are expressions of the protagonist's gloom and despair. A ballad is usually more like a narrative, with a narrator – who may be expressing his or her emotions – as well as with dramatic utterances by characters who are expressing their emotions during the events recounted in the story. Cone goes on to generalize this idea first to program music such as Berlioz's Symphonie Fantastique and then to "pure" instrumental music:

> In every case there is a musical persona that is the experiencing subject of the entire composition, in whose thought the play, or narrative, or reverie, takes place - whose inner life the music communicates by means of symbolic gesture. 18

Cone is over-generalizing here. It is no doubt true that most music composed outside the electronic music lab is composed by a thinking, feeling composer, but this is different from saying that the composer somehow injects himself into the music so that there is a persona of the composer in the music whose inner life the music

16 Cone (1974), p. 2. 17 Ibid., p. 5. 18 Ibid., p. 94.

communicates. Some Romantic composers specifically talked and thought this way, but the idea of music as self-expression in this sense was an innovation of Romanticism. Such a way of thinking would have seemed very strange to Bach or

Rameau. For this reason, I think it is appropriate to look for musical personae only in Romantic and post-Romantic music that can plausibly be interpreted this way either because the composer explicitly encourages such an interpretation, as in the Symphonie Fantastique , or because the composer is working in light of this kind of precedent. 19

Now, it's true that there are no literal agents in instrumental music. We have to imagine them. But we also have to imagine the performer of a dance work as a black swan or a nutcracker, the singer of "Gute Nacht" as a lovelorn youth and the speaker of Shelley's Ode as a Romantic poet. We have to imagine what Nolde's dancers are like; we are not given a photographic image of them. And we have to imagine what Constable's mental landscape is like from contemplating the painted landscapes that he made. Hence it is not as if we are doing something so very different when we imagine a persona in a piece of instrumental music, especially when there is warrant from the composer, as in Berlioz. Just as we treat a dance piece or a painting as expressions of emotion in an agent or persona, whether it be the authorial persona or a character in the work, so we treat some pieces of music as expressions of emotion in a persona whom we imagine in the work. 20

d. Expression in life versus expression in art

The examples I have enumerated are all examples of artworks that express emotions in ways that are analogous to the ways in which people express their emotions in ordinary life. Nevertheless, despite the analogies between much artistic expression

19 Clear examples include (1) Robert Schumann who explicitly described some of his work as involving a conflict between two aspects of his personality, the "Florestan" aspect and the "Eusebius" aspect, and (2) Dmitri Shostakovich who used a signature motif in some of his music that seems to dramatize the composer's own psychological states. See Karl and Robinson (1995): pp. 401-415. In Deeper than Reason I give an extensive defense of the notion of a musical persona in music of this kind. For the opposing viewpoint see Davies (1997), pp. 95-109. 20 Here I am generalizing a suggestion made by Jerrold Levinson in his discussion of "expressiveness" in music. Levinson has emphasized that we can hear music as

the expression of emotion in a persona. See Levinson (1996), pp. 90-125. Later in this paper I will question whether Levinson's view is really a view about expressiveness rather than expression.

and the expression of emotion in ordinary life, there are also significant disanalogies that have often been noted. 21

First, to make an artwork is often a long and deliberate process, very different from what R. G. Collingwood called the "betrayal" of emotion in physiological changes or unstudied gestures. 22 Artists may not know ahead of time what emotion their finished work will express, as Collingwood stipulated, but they usually know that they are writing a poem or painting a painting that will express to the best of their ability some emotion or other, and they also intend for the expression of emotion to be visible or audible in the work itself. Expression in ordinary life is obviously not usually a matter of intentionally putting out evidence that one is in a particular emotional state, and intending it to be perceived as such evidence. Ordinary expression is usually a good deal more spontaneous. 23 And by the same token, even the Romantic artists who explicitly acknowledge they are trying to express their emotions in a work are also careful craftsmen who, in the process of expressing their emotions, are constructing an art object.

Second, the idea that the emotions expressed in an artwork are the emotions of a persona or implied author rather than a real person suggests that when we call an artistic expression of emotion an expression , we are treating it as a genuine expression of emotion, even though this requires some imaginative activity on our part. We are not always experiencing a sincere outpouring by an actual person before us, as when we see and listen to an actual person weeping out of grief. Instead, we are perhaps watching a performer in a dance or a theatrical work who is enacting an expression of emotion; the expression seems to be an outpouring by the character, although the performer is herself (to some extent) unmoved. Or we are looking at

characters in a painting or sculpture who appear to be expressing emotions: we interpret the depicted characters as expressing their emotions. Or we infer from the painter's or poet's treatment of the theme or content of the artwork that the artist is expressing his or her own emotions or attitudes towards that theme or content, but we recognize that it is really only the implied author, the author as he or she seems to be

21 Peter Kivy says that "expression" in the phrase "artistic expression" is a "term of art." See Kivy (2006), p. 299. 22 But Collingwood probably makes too much of this distinction. For example, The Oath of the Horatii expresses the fearfulness and tenderness of the womenfolk by showing how they betray their emotions. 23 But not all expression outside the arts is spontaneous. As Peter Goldie reminds me, there are ritualized expressions of emotion in non-artistic contexts, such as (some) funerals.

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from the evidence of the work, who is expressing 'his' or 'her' emotion. (therefor I see a successful painting or a higher value of the art piece of the artist who's capable of transferring emotions with high transparency).

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/An_Oak_Tree

An Oak Tree is a conceptual work of art[1] created by Michael Craig-Martin RA in 1973. The piece, described as being an oak tree, is installed in two units - a pristine installation of a glass

of water on a glass shelf on metal brackets 253 centimetres above the ground, and a text mounted on the wall. When first exhibited, the text was given as a handout.[2][3][4]

The text takes the form of a Q&A about the artwork, in which Craig-Martin describes changing "a glass of water into a full-grown oak tree without altering the accidents of the glass of water," and explains that "the actual oak tree is physically present but in the form of the glass of water." Craig-Martin considered "the work of art in such a way as to reveal its single basic and essential element, belief that is the confident faith of the artist in his capacity to speak and the willing faith of the viewer in accepting what he has to say".[3]

The work makes the same claim as the Roman Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation and the Real Presence.[5]

The original is in the National Gallery of Australia and an artist's copy is on loan to the Tate gallery.

Artwork[edit source | editbeta]

An Oak Tree is a work of art created by Michael Craig-Martin in 1973, and is now exhibited with the accompanying text, originally issued as a leaflet.[2] The text is in red print on white; the object is a French Duralex glass, which contains water to a level stipulated by the artist and which is located on a glass shelf, whose ideal height is 253 centimetres with matte grey-painted brackets screwed to the wall.[2] The text is behind glass and is fixed to the wall with four bolts.[2] Craig-Martin has stressed that the components should maintain a pristine appearance and in the event of deterioration, the brackets should be resprayed and the glass and shelf even replaced.[2]

The text contains a semiotic argument,[6] in the form of questions and answers,[3] which explain that it is not a glass of water, but "a full-grown oak tree," created "without altering the accidents of the glass of water."[4] The text defines accidents as "The colour, feel, weight, size...". The text includes the statement "It's not a symbol. I have changed the physical substance of the glass of water into that of an oak tree. I didn't change its appearance. The actual oak tree is physically present, but in the form of a glass of water."[4] and "It would no longer be accurate to call it a glass of water. One could call it anything one wished but that would not alter the fact that it is an oak tree."[4]

The impossible is deliberately asserted and the text examines the impossibility of the assertion, which uses the idea of transubstantiation in the same way as the Catholic religious belief that bread and wine, while maintaining an unchanged appearance, are changed into Christ's body and blood.[3] Craig-Martin has a Catholic background[7] and was an altar boy.[8] He sees belief of both artist and viewer as having a key place in art, and that in *An Oak Tree* he had

"deconstructed the work of art in such a way as to reveal its single basic and essential element", namely this belief.[3]

An Oak Tree was a turning point in his artistic development: prior to it his concern had been deconstruction, and afterwards he was "trying to put the pieces together again."[3] Subsequently, using the rationale of Marcel Duchamp's *Fountain*, he worked with drawings of utilitarian objects and flat areas of colour, with the goal of discarding meaning, which is "both persistent and unstable", although he states that people's need to create associations and meanings makes this goal unachievable.[3]

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8- Beardsley's Aesthetics

First published Tue Sep 13, 2005

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/beardsley-aesthetics/#5

5. The Intentions of the Artist

Despite his many books and articles, Beardsley is probably best known for his very first article in aesthetics. In "The Intentional Fallacy," a paper co-written with William K. Wimsatt and published in 1946 (and widely re-printed, e.g., in Joseph Margolis, ed., *Philosophy Looks at the Arts*, 3rd edition, 1987), he argued against the neo-Romantic view that a work of art means what the artist says it means, or what he intends it to mean. More precisely, the issue can put in terms of the relation between

1. The artist intended *x* to mean *p* in work *w*

and

2. *x* means *p* in work *w*.

According to E.D. Hirsch, (1) entails (2), at least if w is a literary work, because the meaning of '*x*' simply is what the writer meant or intended by '*x*.' Knowing the artist's intention is thus knowing the work's meaning. That's one end of the spectrum on the relation between (1) and (2).

Beardsley sits at the other end. He holds that the intentions of the artist aren't relevant to the interpretation of a work of art at all. (1) not only doesn't entail (2); in and of itself, it provides no direct evidential support for (2). An artist's intentions have nothing to do with what a work means.

Beardsley was in fact more than consistent on the issue of the intentional fallacy; he also held that

3. The artist intended *w* to have descriptive property *p*

provides no direct evidential support for

4. *W* has descriptive property *p*,

and that

5. The artist intended *w* to have evaluative property *e*

provides no direct evidential support for

6. *W* has evaluative property *e*.

An artist's intentions are utterly irrelevant to the descriptive, interpretive, and evaluative properties of his work.

And in addition to "The Intentional Fallacy," there's also "The Affective Fallacy." In a paper bearing that name, and also co-written with William Wimsatt, Beardsley argues that a person's affective responses to a work of art are irrelevant to its descriptive, interpretive, and evaluative properties.

Beardsley's arguments against intentionalism in interpretation are of a variety of sorts. In "The Intentional Fallacy," he says that the intentions of the artist are neither "available nor desirable" (p. 367), with this meaning that such intentions aren't always available and are never desirable. Since we frequently can and do correctly interpret a work of art with little or no knowledge about the artist, the fact that the artist's intentions aren't always available is enough to show that Hirsch's position is wrong.

"Judging a poem is like judging a pudding or a machine," according to Beardsley. "One demands that it work. It is only because an artifact works that we infer the intention of the artificer …. A poem can *be* only through its *meaning* … yet it *is*, simply *is*, in the sense that we have no excuse for inquiring what part is intended or meant" (p. 368). In other words, a poem or other work of art is independent of its creator, just as any other artifact—a pudding or a washing machine—is. A pudding consists of milk, eggs, and other ingredients, a washing machine of a metal drum, rubber gaskets, and other parts, and a poem of words. In all three cases, the parts exist and are what they are independently of the artificers, and the artifacts are to be judged—and interpreted—on the basis of their properties. There's no need to bring in the artificer.

In *Aesthetics*, the attack is a little different. "We must distinguish between the aesthetic object and the intention in the mind of its creator," Beardsley says, and the irrelevance of the latter to interpretation can be shown if we consider a certain sculpture, "a large, twisted, cruller-shaped object of polished teak, mounted at an oblique angle to the floor." The creator of the sculpture intends it to "symbolize … Human Destiny." Try as we might, however, we "see in it no such symbolic meaning." The philosophical question then is, "Should we say that we have simply missed the symbolism, but that it must be there, since what a statue symbolizes is precisely what its maker makes it symbolize? Or should we say, in the spirit of Alice confronting the extreme semantic conventionalism [intentionalism] of Humpty Dumpty, that the question is whether that object can be made to mean Human Destiny?" Obviously the latter, Beardsley thinks, for the former entails that "anyone can make anything symbolize anything just by saying

it does, for another sculptor could copy the same object and label it 'Spirit of Palm Beach, 1938'" (*Aesthetics*, pp. 18-19, 21).

In addition to sculpture, the irrelevance of the author to the meaning of his text is also argued for by Beardsley, though only partly by counterexample. "Suppose someone utters a sentence," he says. "We can [then] ask two questions: (1) What does the *speaker* mean? (2) What does the *sentence* mean?" Although answers to the two questions usually coincide, they can diverge; people can mean one thing and say another. The reason that's possible is that "what a sentence means depends not on the whim of the individual, and his mental vagaries, but upon public conventions of usage that are tied up with habit patterns in the whole speaking community." Sentence meaning—that is, textual meaning—is thus one thing, and is anchored in "the whole speaking community," while speaker meaning—what the author meant—is quite another, and is anchored in his own, quite possibly idiosyncratic intentions. Thus an author can be wrong about

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Other Internet Resources

- Aesthetics On-Line, maintained by the American Society for Aesthetics.

9- Intentionalism in Aesthetics.

http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/new_literary_history/v029/29.4livingston.html

Paisley Livingston

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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

New Literary History 29.4 (1998) 831-846

Intentionalism in aesthetics is, quite generally, the thesis that the artist's or artists' intentions have a decisive role in the creation of a work of art, and that knowledge of such intentions is a necessary component of at least some adequate interpretive and evaluative claims. In this paper I develop and defend this thesis. I begin with a discussion of some anti-intentionalist arguments. Surveying a range of intentionalist responses to them, I briefly introduce and criticize a fictionalist version of intentionalism before moving on to an approach I call moderate intentionalism. I consider a salient alternative known as hypothetical intentionalism and try to show why moderate intentionalism should be preferred to it.

Saying what, precisely, intentions are is no small problem, and disputes in aesthetics often hinge on rival assumptions about the nature and function of intentions in general. I shall assume, in what follows, that intentions are mental states having semantic contents, various psychological functions, and practical consequences -- but not always the targetted results. I shall not take up any of the more global challenges to intentionalist psychology, such as eliminative materialism or macro-sociological and historicist critiques. I assume, then, that agents sometimes intend to perform an action, such as writing a poem, and that they occasionally succeed in realizing such aims, thereby intentionally doing such things as writing poems.

I. Extreme Intentionalism and Anti-Intentionalism

In an extreme version, intentionalism holds that a work's meanings and its maker's intentions are logically equivalent. Such a thesis still has its defenders, yet it is hard to see how it can be reconciled with the fact that intentions are not always successfully realized. A theory of interpretation based on Humpty Dumpty's semantics does not seem promising. An extreme version of anti-intentionalism also has its advocates, who confront the intentionalist with the following dilemma: either the artist's intentions are successfully realized in the text or structure produced by the artist, in which case the interpreter need not refer to them; or, the artist's intentions are not successfully realized, in which case reference to them is insufficient to justify

a related claim about the work's meanings. Any viable form of intentionalism must find a way out of this dilemma.

A premise of many anti-intentionalist arguments -- including the dilemma just mentioned -- is that if a work has determinate meanings and value, they must be immanent in the artistic text or structure. This sort of empiricism in aesthetics is vulnerable to some powerful criticisms. Not all of the artistically or aesthetically relevant features of a work of art are intrinsic properties of the text; some are relational and can only be known when the text or structure is cognized correctly in the context of its creation. In making this point, a number of philosophers, such as Arthur Danto, David Davies, Jerrold Levinson, and Gregory Currie, have evoked versions of Jorge Luis Borges's fictional example of Pierre Menard: tokens of the same text-type, created in different contexts, manifest different, artistically relevant relational features; to know which features are those of one work as opposed to another work, one must interpret the text in its context of creation.

Once attention has been drawn to the constitutive status of a work's relational properties, cogent responses to the anti-intentionalist dilemma can be formulated. The intentionalist can argue that some successfully realized intentions are not simply redundant with regard to the text's intrinsic features. An example is the intention that a certain meaning be unstated in the text yet implicitly expressed by the work. Even when the intentions are successfully realized, such relations are not immanent in the final artistic structure or text and cannot be simply read off from the latter. Intentionalists also contend that whenever our goal is to evaluate a work as a certain kind of achievement, the artist's intentions, including unsuccessfully executed ones, are always relevant, because *part* of what we want to do is take note of the manner and extent of the artist's realization of the relevant aims. Although it is not the case that success at realizing...

Monday, 26 September 2011

10- THOUGHTS ON ART AND TEACHING

http://thoughtsonartandteaching.blogspot.com/2011/09/interpretation-intentionalism-and.html#axzz2dd2GaJle

Interpretation, Intentionalism and Assessment

In the following post I sketch out two commonly recognised interpretive strategies (Intentionalism and Conventionalism) and propose a third (Culturalism). I then briefly touch on the research of Susan Orr in order to examine some implications for assessment in art education.

In art theory, Intentionalism is the belief that the meaning of an artwork is defined purely by the artist's intention. What the artist says the work is about is what the work is about – no more, no less. Few but the most naïve interpreters of artworks hold much store by this idea since it leaves precious little room for interpretation at all. We might as well ask the artist to write down the meaning and we can all get on with more pressing matters. For this reason Intentionalism is often termed the "intentional fallacy".

The alternative to Intentionalism is sometimes termed Conventionalism. Conventionalist interpretive approaches allow for a more expanded view that accommodates the full range of cultural influences available to the artist. What the artist *could* have meant is now admitted as legitimate currency. It is not difficult to see though, that even this proves an unsatisfactory solution to the vexed question of the meaning of artworks. The artist *could* have meant all sorts of things but must we credit her with each and every one?

The great advantage of the Conventionalist approach is that, instead of constituting the audience as passive receivers of meaning, it invites them to engage in an active process of interpretation. Roland Barthes' *Death of the Author* can be seen as a Conventionalist strategy in this sense because it dispenses entirely with the intention of the artist and places readers centre-stage as active constructors of meaning. For Barthes the key to a text is not to be found in its *origin* but in its *destination*: *"the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author".*

Radical as Barthes' idea appears, the niggling sense that we've overlooked something never seems to completely evaporate. As much as we might wish to neutralise authorial intention it is impossible to ignore its presence, whether real or imagined, pervading the work at all levels. And here emerges a fascinating and often confusing confluence of intention, interpretation and discovery. Artists intuitively embed tacit knowledge in the work they produce and this becomes mingled with any new discoveries that might be stumbled upon. The only 'work' to which the artist can rightfully claim authorship, or any 'reader' attribute to them, is the work the artist has put *in*, whether consciously or tacitly – though, of course, this can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to tease out. Everything else is either the felicity of chance, the projection of readers endowed with conceptual tools that are, so far, foreign to the author or the projection of readers who happen upon their own discoveries that they misattribute to the artist. The magic, such as it is, is merely a confusion over this complex intermingling of tacit intention and unintended discovery – both those of the maker and those of their audience.

Another method (let's call it "Culturalism") of resolving this conundrum is to give up on individualistic explanations of intention altogether. In this scenario both artist and viewer are conceived as products both *of* and *in* culture and, as such, the artwork and any meanings

generated must be seen as the result of a collective cultural dynamic in which works-of-art and works-of-interpretation are considered as conduits through which meaning is channelled, with subtle variations and additions along the way. When seen from this perspective the cause of confusion amongst Intentionalist and Conventionalist approaches can be understood as deriving from their misplaced tendency to attribute credit to an originary authorial presence whereas, in truth, any such presence stretches back indefinitely through cultural history. However, this should not be confused with determinism. The intent of the artist still plays a vital role but, just as technology never reinvents the wheel but rather stands on the shoulders of previous discoveries, so too does culture.

Within the Culturalist approach both kinds of interpretation - reader-centered *and* author-centered coexist. However, whilst this proves a powerful means to overcome some of the conflicts of interpretation it raises several very interesting, not to mention problematic, issues for the evaluation of artworks in a culture primarily reoccupied with the achievement of individuals. In the context of education especially, the issues become yet more pronounced since teachers inevitably have to interpret student work in order to assess it.

Interestingly, when it comes to assessment, art teachers seem to be as given to the intentional fallacy as anyone else. Evidence for this claim can be found in the art and design research of Susan Orr where one quoted lecturer makes the following remark:

"It is essential that you know something about who that person is and what they are trying to do, what they…what they think they're doing in order to….to measure the quality of what they've done".

Orr's work shows that art teachers employ a wide variety of approaches to assessment, both Conventionalist and Intentionalist as well as Culturalist (though whether they would recognise these as such is another question). However, rather than the *what* or *how,* perhaps the real question is *when* ie: at what point in the process are these strategies deployed, or at what point might they be *best* deployed? If art teachers employ Intentionalist strategies during formative

assessment* for example, then this would seem to be entirely appropriate to the formation of relevant feedback. Feedback only makes sense - has value to the learner - when it takes account of what they are aiming to achieve. Only then can advice be directed toward making this end possible or else redirecting attention toward what the teacher believes may be a more profitable goal. Conversely, to employ a single Conventionalist interpretive strategy at a formative stage would likely burden the student with what Karen-Edis Barzman has dubbed a “Master Reading” that universalizes a singular authoritative interpretation thereby terminating or, at best, inhibiting the ongoing work of interpretation by the student.

The issue of Master Readings also extends into the summative* assessment process where teachers debate the marks of students.

"When artwork is being assessed in the studio the lecturers in my studies privileged the assessment views of lecturers who had worked most closely with the students whose artwork was being marked. What this means is that if there was any kind of disagreement about the mark to be awarded the marking team would defer to the lecturer who knew the student best and had worked most closely with them." -Susan Orr

This process of advocacy might *seem* like a equitable form of resolving differences of opinion, however, in practice the results are often far from satisfactory. In all walks of life there exist certain individuals who are more given to the expression and maintenance of strong and stubborn opinions. Students who find themselves under the close tutelage of such individuals are therefore far more likely to be vigorously defended than those who are less fortunate. And, in situations (increasingly common in the current financial climate) where single members of staff are often responsible for entire cohorts of students, this strategy easily slips into an unhelpful, not to mention unhealthy, form of sanctioned favoritism.

So, despite the fact that we might be able to access a greater insight into the *what, how, when* and by *whom* of assessment, this still leaves completely untouched the more profound question of *why?*

* Formative assessment is usually understood as a form of ongoing assessment and feedback whereas Summative assessments are generated at the end of a period of study. A more accurate way to think of these two forms of assessment might be as “Supportive Assessment” (ie: Formative) and or “Unsupportive Assessment” (ie: Summative).

11- Art Interpretation The 2010 Richard Wollheim Memorial Lecture Noël Carroll

Introduction

The topic of this lecture is the interpretation of art, a subject that Richard Wollheim examined not only from a philosophical perspective; it was also an activity he practised with immense penetration, most notably perhaps in his magisterial opus Painting as an Art.1 Although Wollheim had a great deal to say about art interpretation, his name, unfortu- nately, seems to have dropped out of recent debates concerning interpretation. In this lecture, I would like to reintroduce him to the discussion. Specifically, I will attempt to enlist him as a fellow-traveller in the approach to the interpretation of art that I call modest, actual intentionalism. Also, with Wollheim's assistance, I will introduce what might be labelled the 'Linguistic Fallacy', the charge that it is an error to attempt to model all art interpretation on linguistic models. You might think of the Linguistic Fallacy as the actual intentionalist's antidote to the vaunted Intentional Fallacy. After making a case, with Wollheim's help, for something like modest actual intentionalism, I will defend the view against some of its leading rivals—including anti-intentionalism, hypothetical intentionalism, and the value-maximizing theory of interpretation, as defended by Stephen Davies.2

Richard Wollheim and Modest Actual Intentionalism Richard Wollheim falls squarely in the intentionalist camp when it comes to art interpretation. Admittedly, there are some passages in his essay 'Criticism as Retrieval' where Wollheim appears to disavow intentionalism—which passages I will address in due course.3 However, in most of his writing, Wollheim is unabashedly an intentionalist. In Painting as an Art, he maintains 'If we are interested in painting as such or individual paintings, we must start with the artist' (36). Similarly, he maintains that Pictorial meaning, I have been claiming, always rests upon the state of mind of the artist, and the way it leads him to work, and the product that the work brings about in the mind of the suitably informed and sensitive spectator. (188) For example, he contends that, although one can see both Henry VIII and Charles Laughton in Holbein's portrait Henry VIII, the portrait is only of Henry VIII and not of Charles Laugh- ton, because Henry VIII is the subject that Holbein intended (48). Wollheim argues throughout Painting as an Art that the standard of correctness in the interpretation of what the painting represents and expresses is the intentions of the artist where they are fulfilled relative to audiences equipped with the appropriate cognitive stock (89–95).

If the work is a representational painting, the artist's meaning-intention must be recognizable by viewers in the picture. If the picture could represent a bison or an ox, for instance, and the artist intended an ox, that determines the content of the picture so long as the informed and sensitive viewer is able to see an ox in the picture—that is, so long as the ox-interpretation is not incompatible with what can be seen in the image. This is modest, actual intentionalism. It is also Wollheim's view. For Wollheim, the content of the painting is not whatever the artist

intends, come what may. The spectator must be able to identify the content of the artist's intention on the basis of what he sees in the painting. This is undoubtedly related to the Gricean constraint on recognizability when it comes to the artist meaning that x. As Wollheim says, 'the representational artist must at least set himself to do this: to mark the surface in such a way as to ensure that the spectator will not merely identify, he will be able to see, to see in the picture what the picture is intended to represent' (52). For the modest, actual intentional the meaning or content of the artwork is determined by the communicative intention of the artist which intention has the built-in requirement of audience recognizability, a requirement that, at minimum, demands that what is available upon inspection of the artwork be consistent with the intended meaning or content of the artwork. Wollheim embraces modest, actual intentionalism inasmuch as he requires that the meaning or content of the artwork, if it is a painting, be something that can be recognized or seen-in the picture. Like card-carrying modest actual intentionalists, Wollheim holds that in order to determine the meaning of the painting, the artist's intentions regarding the content of the painting concur with what can be recognized in the painting. Insofar as Wollheim shares this Gricean commitment with modest, actual intentionalists, he is, at least by my accounting, an honorary modest, actual intentionalist.

Modest actual intentionalism maintains that the meaning of a work is determined by the intention of the artist insofar as that intention is consistent with the way the work is. That is, the authorial intention that determines the meaning of the artwork must be compatible with what the reader, viewer, or listener can discern in the work, even if only after she has been apprised of what the author intended, including being apprised by the author herself. For example, we may interpret William Wordsworth's sonnet 'Surprised by Joy' as being a meditation about the death of his daughter Caroline because that is what Wordsworth intended and that is consistent with what we can find in the poem. The stipulation that the work support the artist's intention is connected to Paul Grice's analysis of meaning according to which for A to mean something by uttering x, 'A must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience and he must also intend his utterance to be recognized as so intended.' But, Grice adds, 'these intentions are not independent; the recognition is intended to play its part in inducing belief, and if it does not do so, something will have gone wrong with the fulfillment of A's intention.'6 This places an estimable con- straint on the speaker, since her intention includes the intention to be recognized which sug- gests that it should be in accordance with the conventions and practices of communication shared by the speaker and her audience.7 That is, the intention A intends to be recognized

6 Paul Grice, 'Meaning', in Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 219. 7 Stephen Neale, 'Paul Grice's Philosophy of Language', Linguistics and Philosophy, 15 (1992), 509–559.